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Abstract. This article identifies problems with data mining approaches to antiterrorism and
counterterrorism.
A majority of members of the United States (US) Congress seem to have never had or have lost faith in
the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s project formerly known as both the Total Information
Awareness and the Terrorism Information Awareness Program. Regardless of name, the Program was to
have identified terrorist-related concatenations of data and led to antiterrorism and counterterrorism
acts to meet the threat depicted by the data through interpretive rules. Public rationales for never
having or losing faith in the Program have varied not only in substance but in relevance to the purposes
of antiterrorism and counterterrorism.
One significant rationale bears on real and putative violations of civil rights. The degrees of freedom for
US and other citizens given up by collecting, analyzing, maintaining, and acting on information is
deemed too egregious a phenomenon to be counterbalanced by antiterrorism and counterterrorism
benefit.
A related rationale bears on the threat of human rights violations. Here the Program’s data and
predictive statements could be used to an unacceptable degree in effecting noxious acts proscribed by
law against individuals who turn out to be innocent and guilty of terrorism operations or support.
A third rationale bears on the sophisticated reconnaissance, surveillance, and research capabilities of
formal and informal terrorist networks, organizations, and partially overlapping social entities. The
problem here is at least threefold. The interpretive rules of the Program can be identified. Acts leading
to a terrorist operations can be chosen and effected to “fly under the radar” of the rules. And this twostep procedure can be repeated as new rules are developed, identified, and avoided.
A fourth rationale bears on the constraints of empirical science. Given that data mining cannot address
all data and that interpretive rules are subject to the vulnerabilities of inductive—and, to a lesser
degree, deductive—logic, antiterrorism and counterterrorism benefit may not be obtained. A related
belief can be characterized by the seemingly magical properties attributed to a science of reliable and
valid prediction of extremely low probability social events.
A fifth rationale bears on the social transformation of knowledge. An example of this transformation is
that the speed with which a specific piece of information changes its terrorism-related meaning as
perceived by various observers may be faster than the speed with which reliable and valid interpretive
rules can be devised for the Program.
Public oppositional discourse on the Program has been and continues to be weighted much more along
the lines of civil and human rights violations than on the Program’s security, reliability, and validity. And
this discourse continues to create a huge misperception that opposition to the Program will lead the US
Government (USG) to fight terrorism with one hand tied behind its back. Instead, it may well be that
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opposition is only keeping the USG from having a weapon in hand that would not work. In this regard,
the change from Total to Terrorism in the Program’s Title may be not only an exemplar of
propagandistic rhetoric but also an admission that total can’t be accomplished and, regardless, can’t
work. (See Campbell, C., Williams, B., & Gilgen, D. (2002). Is social capital a useful conceptual tool for
exploring community level influences on HIV infection? An exploratory case study from South Africa.
AIDS Care, 14, 41-54; Drobics, M., Bodenhofer, U., & Winiwarter, W. (2002). Mining clusters and
corresponding interpretable descriptions -- A three-stage approach. Expert Systems: International
Journal of Knowledge Engineering & Neural Networks, 19, 224-234; Markoff, J. (May 21, 2003). Experts
say technology is widely disseminated inside and outside military. The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com; Menczer, F. (2003). Complementing search engines with online web mining
agents. Decision Support Systems, 35, 195-212.) (Keywords: Data Mining, Profiling, Terrorism.)
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